State may reallocate resources in the economy not only through the direct intervention in financial intermediation and subsidies to enterprises, but also indirectly, through state regulation of investment activity, enterprises sanctioning violations of financial discipline to the budget and counterparties.Emerging with free soft budget constraints, to a certain extent, companies from the need to attract funding from the financial system.Instead, there is a redistribution of resources within the real sector of profitable industries and enterprises to unprofitable formed, "virtual economy" - a system in which, the state support of investment activity almost lost economic sense.
defaults can be considered as one of the most important sources of financing for enterprises, in any case, the share of non-payments to GDP can be several times greater than the share of bank loans.Funded enterprise so despite any form of state regulation of investment activities shall be exempt from the need to transmit to anyone monitoring powers.As a result - are internalized control.
Against this background degraded state regulation of investment activity, actively deployed the search and rent-seeking, misappropriation of assets, the export of capital, increasing merging of business and government.Moreover, the lack of an active structural policy from the government, attempts to compensate through state intervention in the redistribution of resources, lead to the deepening of structural imbalances in the economy and enhance its raw material orientation.
This specific financing structure and soft budget constraints determine the internalization of control.The reason for the stability of the soft budget constraints, as well as state intervention in the redistribution of investment resources, is the political interaction of the state and the corporate sector.This would not be quite correct to reduce the process to a lobbying industry leadership, seeking to change the state regulation of investment activity and its vector.
Equally important here is the political activity and the rank and file workers of the enterprises, which thus protect their human capital.To a certain extent, this situation falls within the definition of "institutional traps" Permission VM Polterovich, where the institutional trap refers to the rate or method of inefficient behavior of economic agents, which are stable, despite the presence of more effective alternative ways of behavior.Stability of ineffective regulations resulting in high costs of transition to another norm, or transformation costs, which may negate the efficiency gains achieved as a result of the transition.
Indeed, in terms of large-scale structural imbalances in the economy, in the absence of a developed banking system and efficient stock market, state regulation of investment activity and its role in the redistribution of financial resources proved to be in the best interests of the majority of post-Soviet companies.Formed largely through their impact on the political process, the system of financing and, as a consequence, the management of industrial companies, is quite stable today as quite happy and enterprises of the real sector, financial institutions and governments.
Attempts to reform the mechanisms of management of the companies apart from restructuring and institutional reforms have led to the formation of inefficient, but fairly stable financing and corporate governance.They formed the internalization of funding, which in turn leads to the internalization of control, ie. E. Independence from the corporate owners of foreign investors.
In order to change the situation with corporate governance requires an active structural policy, the removal of restrictions on the movement of human resources within the national economies, sound social policy, effective centralized control over the implementation of reforms and the implementation of legal acts, the fight against corruption and all-roundpromote the development of new firms.
