Among the problems the analysis of transition economy a central place occupied by the problem of corporate governance transformation of property relations.In fact, it is a clear consolidation and redistribution of property rights and methods of business management at the time were hailed as one of the main objectives of economic reforms in the former Soviet Union.In pursuing this goal, national governments have implemented and carried out large-scale privatization program, developed corporate law, generated by new organizational methods of administrative management.Progress in the reforms attracted attention of researchers.A number of papers on economics analyzes the problems of the evolution of corporate governance, assesses the efficiency of enterprise management from the perspective of contemporary approaches to the study of changes in market conditions.
question that very often now wonder economists is why, despite the great mass privatization program designed to actually create a market of property rights, despite serious efforts to launch the redistribution processes, the distribution of formal and, particularly, informalownership, management practices now in post-Soviet companies are still far from the ideal to which the authors sought to reform.Why do these corporations continue to exist internalization control position at which the company's management is independent of any outside influence, even if formally a significant portion of the assets owned by external owners?
The most common approach to the analysis of the situation surrounding corporate governance is largely a microeconomic character.That is, in fact, the situation is analyzed from the standpoint of a single corporation, examines the factors that enable the management company to ignore the interests of outside investors, they only use the convenient methods of enterprise management and successfully pursue their own interests.Particular attention is paid to the ineffectiveness of the legislation and the judicial system.To deny the importance of legal factors impossible, as research shows, the distribution of control in corporations is actually in quite explicit, depending on the quality of corporate law and the effectiveness of its implementation.It appears, however, that consideration of these factors as a given, limits our knowledge of the subject, making them fragmented.Legislation and government policies are the product of the struggle of various interest groups.It applies to legislation governing the relationship between the real and financial sectors.
Therefore, the root causes that determine the evolution of corporate governance, management techniques now to be found in the relevant structural features of the economic system.Analysis of methods, technologies and procedures of corporate governance in the economy can and should be supplemented with reference to specific economic factors of the formation of a system of management, or that the distribution control.This thesis aims to implement the two main objectives: first - to formulate a theoretical problem related to the concept of corporate governance, and the second - is to motivate economic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the corporate governance and ownership relations.
